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HOW CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE HAMPERED
DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITING PRINCIPLES
FOR SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT NOW
GREGORY J. WERDEN*
The Sherman Act is a cornerstone of U.S. economic policy.1 As
the Supreme Court noted, it “has a generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions,”2
which “compelled the courts to work out its meaning from case to
case.”3 Section 1 prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of [U.S.] trade or
commerce.”4 Section 2 declares it unlawful for any person to
“monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of” U.S. trade or
commerce.5
The first judicial review of a Section 2 claim began with the
observation that: “It is not very clear what [C]ongress meant.”6 It and
other early Section 2 decisions found it necessary to identify limiting
principles cabining the legal concept of “monopolization.” The lower
courts had made substantial progress before their efforts were
undermined by Chief Justice Edward D. White, Jr.’s 1911 opinions in
                                                
* Gregory J. Werden is Senior Economic Counsel, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice. The views expressed herein are not purported to reflect
those of the U.S. Department of Justice.
1 “Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms.” United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 610 (1972). “The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade.” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). “The Sherman Act is
a Magna Charta among the statutes of the United States.” ALBERT H. WALKER,
HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at iv (1910).
2 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1936).
3 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 230 (1941).
4 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
5 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
6 In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 115 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892) (This was the assessment of
Judge Howell E. Jackson who was elevated to the Supreme Court just six months
later).
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American Tobacco7 and Standard Oil.8 This article documents how
Chief Justice White set back the orderly development of Section 2
limiting principles in ways that the Supreme Court still has not fully
corrected.
Part I compiles history relevant to identifying the evil Section 2
addresses and recounts its legislative history. Part II examines the
meaning of the verb “to monopolize” when the Sherman Act was
written, and recounts earliest judicial efforts to articulate limiting
principles for Section 2. Part III reviews American Tobacco and
Standard Oil, contrasting the interpretation of Section 2 in Chief
Justice White’s opinions with those of the lower courts, and
documenting his impact on the articulation of Section 2 principles. Part
IV sketches how the law could have developed differently. Part V
concludes with suggestions for how 21st Century Section 2 decisions
can complete the work begun in the 19th Century.
I. EVENTS LEADING TO SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Events Motivating Section 2 of the Sherman Act9
John D. Rockefeller entered the infant oil business in 1865; he took
on partners in 1867; and they incorporated Standard Oil Co. of Ohio
in 1870.10 In less than a decade, Standard Oil achieved a dominant
market position11 through superior efficiency and preferential freight
rates negotiated with railroads.12 An 1879 report by a special
committee of the New York State Assembly first drew the public’s
attention to the terms Standard Oil had secured from railroads in New
York and Pennsylvania.13 Standard Oil was not just paying low rates,
                                                
7 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
8 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
9 This subsection is an attempt to recreate what members of Congress would have
known when the Sherman Act was written, relying mainly on sources that would
have been readily available to them.
10 GILBERT HOLLAND MONTAGUE, THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE STANDARD OIL
COMPANY 1–7 (1903).
11 Id. at 1, 12, 63.
12 Id. at 10–65.
13 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, APPOINTED UNDER A
RESOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED ABUSES IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF RAILROADS CHARTERED BY THE STATE OF NEW YORK 40–46
(N.Y. 1879) (Hepburn Report). The report found that: “The history of this
corporation is a unique illustration of the possible outgrowth of the present system
of railroad management, in giving preferential rates, and also showing the colossal
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it also was receiving from the railroads a portion of what its rivals paid
them to ship their oil.
Muckraking journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd asserted in 1881 that
“the means by which [Standard Oil] achieved monopoly was by
conspiracy with the railroads.”14 He claimed that the New York
Central Railroad paid Standard Oil “rebates [of] millions of dollars,
which have enabled it to crush out all competitors.”15 And he charged
that the Pennsylvania Railroad’s discriminatory rates and rebates
resulted in a “heavy profit” for Standard Oil on every barrel of oil it
shipped and a “heavy loss” for its competitors on every barrel they
shipped.16
The foregoing preceded the January 2, 1882 formation of the
Standard Oil Trust, from which we got the word “antitrust.” The shares
of nearly forty separate corporations were placed under the control of
nine trustees empowered to operate the companies as a cartel.17 A few
other trusts on the same model were formed, notably in sugar and
whiskey, and many other from industrial combinations arose as well.18
The word “trust” soon was “popularly applied to all methods of
                                                
proportions to which monopoly can grow under the laws of this country.” Id. at 40–
41. Evidence compiled in the investigation was summarized by John C. Walsh, The
Standard Oil Company, 136 N. AM. REV. 191 (1883).
14 H.D. Lloyd, Story of a Great Monopoly, 47 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 317, 322
(1881); see also HENRY DEMAREST LLOYD, WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH
(1894) (later book on Standard Oil). This conspiracy theory has supporters:
Benjamin Klein, The Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracy That Created the Standard Oil
Monopoly, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 459 (2012); Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein,
Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1996).
15 Lloyd, supra note 14, at 323.
16 Id. at 325.
17 RALPH W. HIDY & MURIEL E. HIDY, PIONEERING IN BIG BUSINESS, 1882–1911:
HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (NEW JERSEY) 40–49 (1955). The cartel
was imperfect as it held only a minority stake in some companies. The Standard Oil
Trust was reorganized as a holding company in 1892. Id. at 219–32. The Supreme
Court of Ohio precipitated the reorganization by ruling that the Standard Oil Co. of
Ohio could not be controlled by a trust. State v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279
(Ohio 1892). In 1899, the stock of all of the held companies was transferred to the
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. HIDY & HIDY, supra, at 306–13.
18 ELIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 20–22 (1921)
(detailing other trusts on the Standard Oil model); Luther Conant, Jr., Industrial
Consolidations in the United States, 7 PUBL’NS AM. STAT. ASS’N 1, 2–3 (1901)
(listing all 1880’s consolidations by year). For a history of the trust movement and
the response see Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279 (2013).
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effecting a combination in trade.”19
Exclusionary conduct by the “trusts” was a matter of concern to
editorial writers by 1887. A legal publication asserted that a trust first
“serves notice upon” a competitor that he must join or the trust “will
destroy him,” and if he refuses, the trust “proceeds to sell the
commodity in his market and to his customers for less than he can
afford to manufacture it for and for less than what its manufacture costs
the ‘trust.’”20 And the New York Times charged that a trust “aims to
obtain a monopoly in some branch of industry, and when its power has
been sufficiently developed it becomes an oppressor and a tyrant,
crushing weak competitors who do not accept its terms and excluding
from its chosen field manufacturers and merchants who may desire to
do an independent business in it.”21 The Times later declared that the
“infamous methods of the Standard Oil Trust cannot be too severely
denounced” and that its “history is full of iniquity.”22
The New York Times also called for action: “The multiplication of
great trade conspiracies called Trusts . . . sets before the people of this
country a problem which, in defense of their rights, they must soon
undertake to solve.”23 And trusts quickly became a significant political
issue. President Grover Cleveland’s annual message to Congress,
delivered December 6, 1887, declared that “competition is too often
strangled by combinations quite prevalent at this time, and frequently
called trusts, which have for their object the regulation of the supply
and price of commodities made and sold by members of the
                                                
19 WILLIAM W. COOK, “TRUSTS” THE RECENT COMBINATIONS IN TRADE 4 (1888).
See CHARLES WHITING BAKER, MONOPOLIES AND THE PEOPLE 7 (1889) (The word
“trust” was “rather loosely used to denote any combination formed for the purpose
of restricting or killing competition.”); E. Benjamin Andrews, Trusts According to
Official Investigations, 3 Q.J. ECON. 117, 119 (1889) (“The most diverse species of
joint undertakings are popularly stigmatized as ‘trusts’. . . .”). By the turn of the
20th Century, the word “trust” also embraced “any corporation that is big enough
to be menacing.” John Bates Clark, The Necessity of Restraining Monopolies while
Retaining Trusts, CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS 404 (Franklin H. Head, ed.
1899); see JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS, THE TRUST PROBLEM 8 (rev. ed. 1903)
(“‘Trusts’ are taken to mean manufacturing corporations with so great capital and
power that they are at least thought by the public to have become a menace to their
welfare, and to have, temporarily at least, considerable monopolistic power.”).
20 The So-Called “Trusts,” 21 AM. L. REV. 976, 976–77 (1887).
21 The People and the Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1887, at 4.
22 The Oil Trust and the Knights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1887, at 4.
23 “Trust” Conspiracies, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1887, at 4; see also The People and
the Trusts, supra note 21, at 4 (“The concentration of power by the creation of so-
called Trusts presents a problem which will soon demand and receive the attention
of courts and legislative bodies.”).
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combination.”24
On January 25, 1888, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a
resolution directing its Committee on Manufacturers to investigate
trusts.25 In hearings on the sugar trust, a witness charged that: “The
Standard Oil people will run its market down to nothing in one section
of the country in order to break down and get control of that particular
market, while in other sections they would be getting full profits.”26
The subsequent hearings on the Standard Oil Trust devoted much
attention to Standard’s preferential railroad rates and rebates, and the
attendant harm to small refiners.27
The Committee’s report on the hearings reproduced much of the
trial record from recent cases involving charges of exclusionary
conduct against the Standard Oil Trust.28 In February 1886, Hiram B.
Everest and his son Charles M. Everest, officers of Trust member
Vacuum Oil Co., had been indicted for conspiring “to obtain, maintain,
and continue a monopoly of the business of producing, refining,
manufacturing, buying and selling petroleum.”29 The defendants were
charged with furthering the Trust’s interests by attempting to destroy
the Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co.30 The indictment specifically alleged
that the defendants bribed a Buffalo Lubricating employee to sabotage
its refinery so it “could not be successfully operated, but would blow
                                                
24 19 CONG. REC. 1, 11 ( 1887). Written messages then fulfilled the requirement of
U.S. Const., art. II, § 3, cl. 1, which now is fulfilled by the State of the Union
Address (except at the outset of a presidential administration).
25 19 CONG. REC. 719–23 (1888).
26Trusts, H.R. REP. NO. 50-3112, at 63 (1888) (testimony of wholesale grocer
Francis B. Thurber). Whether Standard Oil engaged predatory pricing under current
standards is in dispute. A modern account based on original source material states
that Standard Oil routinely priced at cost where it faced competition. RON
CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 258 (1998). Only
below-cost pricing, however, is deemed predatory. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993). But below-cost pricing is
precisely what the government argued Standard Oil had done. Brief for the United
States, Vol. 1: Summary of the Facts and Brief of the Law at 351, Standard Oil Co.
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (No. 10-398).
27 See The Standard Oil Trust, H.R. REP. NO. 50-3112, at 116–265 (1888). Relying
on this sort of evidence, prominent economist Richard T. Ely asserted that Standard
Oil “obtained a monopoly through an alliance with the railroads of the country, and
this gave it special freight rates which no one else could secure.” RICHARD T. ELY,
PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY: A DISCUSSION OF PROTECTIVE TARIFFS, TAXATION, AND
MONOPOLIES 202 (3d ed. 1890).
28 The Standard Oil Trust, H.R. REP. NO. 50-3112, at 801–951 (1888).
29 Id. at 801 (text of indictment).
30 Id. at 802, 867.
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up and explode.”31 The refinery did not explode, but the defendants
were convicted,32 and their convictions were upheld on appeal.33
B. The Legislative History of Section 2
The Democratic Party platform for the 1888 election (adopted June
5) proclaimed: “Judged by Democratic principles, the interests of the
people are betrayed when, by unnecessary taxation, trusts and
combinations are permitted to exist, which, while unduly enriching the
few that combine, rob the body of our citizens by depriving them of
the benefits of natural competition.”34 The Republican Party platform
(adopted June 19) more boldly declared the Party’s “opposition to all
combinations of capital, organized in trusts or otherwise, to control
arbitrarily the condition of trade among our citizens.”35
Benjamin Harrison was elected president on the latter platform,
and his first annual message to Congress delivered December 3, 1889
included this plea:
Earnest attention should be given by Congress to a
consideration of the question how far the restraint of those
combinations of capital commonly called “trusts” is a matter
of Federal jurisdiction. When organized, as they often are, to
crush out all healthy competition and to monopolize the
production or sale of an article of commerce and general
necessity, they are dangerous conspiracies against the public
good, and should be made subject of prohibitory and even
penal legislation.36
                                                
31 Id. at 802–03.
32 See A Standard Oil Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1887, at 4. A damages suit
against Standard Oil established the liability of a corporation for damages resulting
from a conspiracy. See Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 12 N.E.
825 (N.Y. 1887); see also CHARLES FISK BEACH SR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MONOPOLIES AND INDUSTRIAL TRUSTS 235 (1898) (citing this as the “leading case
on this subject”).
33 People v. Everest, 3 N.Y.S. 612, 617 (1889).
34 Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
Democratic Party Platforms: 1888 Democratic Party Platform (June 5, 1888),
availible at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/27318.
35 Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
Republican Party Platforms: Republican Party Platfrom of 1888 (June 19, 1988),
available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273311.
36 21 CONG. REC. 84, 87 (1889).
2019] HOW CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE HAMPERED DEVELOPMENT 69
When the 51st Congress convened the next day, Senator John Sherman
introduced S. 1 which would have prohibited “all arrangements . . . to
prevent full and free competition.”37 In the floor debate on his bill,
Sherman mentioned that trusts gained market dominance through
predatory pricing,38 and he cited Standard Oil’s extraction of
preferential rates and rebates from the railroads as a means of
undermining its competitors.39 But Sherman did not include anything
like Section 2 in his bill.
After much floor debate, S. 1 was referred to the Judiciary
Committee, which rewrote the bill, and reported it back on April 2 with
a new Section 2. Senator Sherman grudgingly supported the
Committee’s version, declaring it “the best under all the circumstances
that the Senate is prepared to give.”40 The Committee’s versions of
Sections 1 and 2 were enacted,41 and history credits it’s Chairman,
George F. Edmunds, with authorship of both Section 2 and most of
Section 1.42 Section 2 was debated in the Senate on April 8, 1890,
                                                
37 S. 1, 51st Cong. (1889).
38 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (trusts “reduce prices in
a particular locality and break down competition”).
39 Id. at 2457–58. Sherman cited Handy v. Cleveland & Marietta R.R. Co., 31 F.
689, 692 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1887), which indicated that one small refiner was charged
250% more for shipping than Standard Oil, with all of the difference paid to
Standard Oil. Sherman also cited evidence of railroad rate discrimination by
railroads from an investigation by a special master appointed by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. That evidence was included in the 1888 report of the House
Committee on Manufacturers. The Standard Oil Trust, H.R. REP. NO. 50-3112, at
119–23 (1888). Based on this evidence, John D. Rockefeller and eight other
individuals were indicted on April 20, 1879, with the state-law charges resembling
those could later have been made under Section 2. An influential book on Standard
Oil termed the resolution of the case “the compromise of 1880.” IDA M. TARBELL,
THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 239–62 (1904).
40 21 CONG. REC. 3145 (1890).
41 Compare Sherman Act, 14 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018), with S. 1, §§ 1–2, 21 CONG.
REC. 2901, 3145 (1890).
42 See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICAN: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT 94 (1965); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY 151, 210–13 (1954). Another Committee member, George F.
Hoar, claimed credit thirteen years after the event. See 2 GEORGE F. HOAR,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 363–64 (1903); Letter from Hoar to Senator
Joseph B. Foraker (May 28, 1903), reprinted in M.H. BRUMPHREY, AUTHORSHIP
OF THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST LAW 2 (1912) (report by staffer Marvin Hale
Brumphrey at the direction of Senator Foraker). This claim was repeated by
WALKER, supra note 1, at 27–28. After reading Walker’s book, Edmunds
suggested that he inspect the Judiciary Committee’s records. Doing so led Walker
to credit Edmunds in two open letters. Letter to Senator Moses E. Clapp (July 21,
1911), reprinted at 47 CONG. REC. 3485–86 (1911); Who Wrote the Sherman Law,
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when Chairman Edmunds and Committee member George F. Hoar
responded to questions posed by fellow Senators.43
Senator John E. Kenna asked whether Section 2 criminalized
success “by virtue of . . . superior skill.”44 Edmunds answered that it
did not because that was not “monopoly” under the law.45 Still unsure
about what Section 2 prohibited, future Third Circuit judge, Senator
George Gray, proposed an amendment that would have made Section
2 condemn only a “person who shall combine or conspire with any
other person or persons to monopolize.”46 Hoar addressed Gray’s
uncertainty. He advised “that ‘monopoly’ is a technical term known to
the common law . . . which has a clear and legal signification, and this
is it: It is the sole engrossing to a man’s self by means which prevent
other men from engaging in fair competition with him.”47 He asserted
that a “monopoly” did not exist when “the whole business” in some
field was obtained through “superior skill and intelligence.”48 As an
example of what did constitute “monopoly,” he cited control over “the
whole business” in a field achieved through “the use of means which
made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition,”
such as “buying up of all other persons engaged in the same
business.”49
Senator Kenna asked whether monopoly was prohibited at
common law, and if so, why Section 2 was needed.50 Hoar explained
that Section 2 was needed “to extend the common-law principles,
which protected fair competition in trade in old times in England.”51
Edmunds then readWebster’s definitions of the verb “to monopolize”:
1. To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of, as a
commodity or goods in market, with the view to appropriate or
control the exclusive sale of; as, to monopolize sugar or tea.
                                                
NEW YORK PRESS, Sept. 24, 1911, at 4, reprinted in 73 CENT. L. J. 257 (1911).
Walker’s attribution was supported by Francis E. Leupp, The Father of the Anti-
Trust Law, 99 OUTLOOK 271, 274 (1911).
43 The even briefer House debate consisted of a few comments by floor manager
David B. Culberson when the House considered S. 1 as passed by the Senate. See
21 CONG. REC. 4090 (1890).
44 21 CONG. REC. 3151 (1890).
45 Id. at 3151–52.
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2. To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right of,
especially the right of trading to any place, or with any country
or district; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade.52
Edmunds explained that the Judiciary Committee’s members were in
agreement that “if one person instead of two, by a combination” were
to monopolize “it was just as offensive and injurious to the public
interest as if two had combined to do it.”53 The last thing the Senate
did before passing S. 1 was reject the Gray amendment, thus clearly
opting to supplement the concerted conduct prohibition in Section 1
with a unilateral conduct prohibition in Section 2.
II. THE FIRST EFFORTS TO CRAFT
LIMITING PRINCIPLES FOR SECTION 2
A. The Meaning of the Verb “to Monopolize” in 1890
Section 2 had no common law antecedent,54 and Senator Edmund’s
relied onWebster’s because the verb “to monopolize” had no technical
meaning in law.55 Before 1890, the Supreme Court had used the verb
“to monopolize” in a handful of cases, always to mean to concentrate
                                                
52 Id. These definitions are found in CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH & NOAH PORTER,
DR. WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF ALL THE WORDS IN THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 855 (1864).
53 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890) (statement by Sen. Edmunds). Most commentary
citing the Section 2 debate for the meaning of its text is over a century old. See
WALKER, supra note 1, at 27–28; Edward A. Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law
and under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 31 HARV. L. REV. 246, 247–51 (1917).
After reviewing highlights from the debate, Professor Hovenkamp much more
recently concluded that: “The only thing that seems clear is that the monopolizing
offense refers to someone who acquires or attempts to acquire all of the business in
the market, and that this acquisition could not be the result of superior skill or
industry.” Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1035, 1035–36 (2000). The Supreme Court only once cited the Section 2 debate to
inform the meaning of the text but drew no conclusions. See United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390–91 & n.15 (1956).
54 See William F. Dana, “Monopoly” under the National Anti-Trust Act, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 338, 342 (1894) (“at common law, there was no such offence as
‘monopolizing’”).
55 No law dictionary contemporary with the Sherman Act defined the verb “to
monopolize.” See WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1889); HENRY
CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1891); J. KENDRICK KINNEY, A LAW
DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY (1893); STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT L. LAWRENCE,
A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW (1888).
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control over property, privilege, or power.56 Similar usage of the word
appears in decisions of the old circuit courts.57 Many decisions aptly
described the effect of a patent, trademark, or copyright using the verb
“to monopolize.”58 The Corpus of Historical American English
(COHA) records 89 examples of “to monopolize” during the period
1860–89.59 They divide in roughly equal numbers between usages with
and without reference to commerce.
1880s circuit court decisions used the verb “to monopolize” in
describing how powerful railroads harmed the public. A decision
enjoining discriminatory railroad rates based on volume opined that
the discrimination could “extinguish all petty competition, monopolize
business, and dictate the price of coals and every other commodity to
consumers.”60 A decision enjoining a railroad’s discrimination among
customers in service sought to deny the railroad the power to
“exterminate or very materially cripple competition, and in large
measure monopolize and control these several branches of useful
commerce, and dictate such terms as avarice may suggest.”61 In a third
case, a railroad had organized an express company and the court
enjoined the termination of its long-standing arrangement with another
express company, observing that railroads, if unchecked, could
“monopolize the business, and dictate oppressive rates, while
affording less safety, celerity and convenience to customers.”62
State courts used the verb “to monopolize” much as federal courts,
                                                
56 See Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55, 59 (1879); United States v. Mayor,
Alderman, & Inhabitants of Cities of Phila. & New Orleans, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
609, 650 (1850); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 613 (1834); Pennock v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829).
57 See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Tenn., 19 F.
679, 689 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1884); Adams Express Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry.
Co., 16 F. 712, 713 (C.C.D. Colo. 1883); McCoy v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St.
Louis & Chi. R.R. Co., 13 F. 3, 6 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882); United States v.
Kochersperger, 26 F. Cas. 803, 809 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1860).
58 See, e.g., Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Berkshire Nat’l Bank, 17 F. 531, 532 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1883) (patent); Hubbell v. De Land, 14 F. 471, 472 (C.C.E.D. Wisc. 1882)
(patent); Burton v. Stratton, 12 F. 696, 699 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1882) (trademark);
Root v. Lamb, 7 F. 222, 226 (C.C.D. Mass. 1881) (patent); Wooster v. Calhoun, 30
F. Cas. 610, 611 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1873) (patent); Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511,
517 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (copyright).
59 COHA contains more than 400 million words from over 100,000 texts from 1810
to the present. Corpus of Historical American English, https://corpus.byu.edu/coha.
60 John Hays & Co. v. Pa. Co., 12 F. 309, 314 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1882).
61 Coe v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 3 F. 775, 779 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1880).
62 Dinsmore v. Louisville, Cincinnati & Lexington Ry. Co., 2 F. 465, 471 (C.C.D.
Ky. 1880).
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most often referring to actions that concentrated control over property,
privilege, or power,63 and sometimes in the closely related sense of
physically occupying property in a manner denying its use to others.64
Just a few decisions used the word in relation to competition.65 Two
1889 decisions are illustrative, and Senator Sherman quoted both in
his March 21, 1890 floor speech in support of his bill.66 The Supreme
Court of Michigan refused to enforce a contract entered into by officers
of the Diamond Match Co. as part of an “odious” scheme.67 The
company had been organized “to monopolize and control the business
of making all the friction matches in the country.”68 The Supreme
Court of Illinois held that Chicago Gas Trust Co. could not lawfully
hold stock (all majority interests) in the four gas companies serving
Chicago.69 The court declared that the company “intended to bring the
four companies under its control, and, by crushing out competition, to
monopolize the gas business in Chicago.”70
                                                
63 See, e.g., Bailly v. Nashawannuck Mfg. Co., 10 N.Y.S. 224, 224 (1890);
Melendy v. Barbour, 78 Va. 544, 557 (1884); Commonwealth v. Bearse, 132 Mass.
542, 551 (1882); Drake v. Rogers, 13 Ohio St. 21, 37 (1861); Herman v. State, 8
Ind. 545, 549 (1855); Harris v. Tysons, 24 Pa. 347, 362 (1855).
64 See, e.g., A.C. Conn Co. v. Little Suamico Lumber & Mfg. Co., 43 N.W. 660,
663 (Wisc. 1889); Newell v. Minneapolis, L. & M. Ry. Co., 27 N.W. 839, 840
(Minn. 1886); Buchanan v. Grand River Log Co., 12 N.W. 490, 492 (Mich. 1882);
Stetson v. City of Bangor, 60 Me. 313, 320 (1872); Atl. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. City of
St. Louis, 66 Mo. 228, 235 (1877).
65 See, e.g., Goodman v. Henderson, 58 Ga. 567, 570 (Ga. 1877); Craft v.
McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 349 (Ill. 1875); Stewart v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 17
Minn. 372, 397 (Minn. 1871); People v. N. River Sugar Refining Co., 3 N.Y.S.
401, 412 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1889); Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888);
Barnard v. Roane Iron Co., 2 S.W. 21, 24 (Tenn. 1886); Murray v. Buell, 41 N.W.
1010, 1012 (Wis. 1889).
66 21 CONG. REC. 2458–59 (1890) (statement by Sen. Sherman).
67 Richardson v. Buhl, 43 N.W. 1102, 1110 (Mich. 1889). Russell A. Alger, a rival
of Sherman for the 1888 Republican presidential nomination, was a defendant.
Sherman believed that improper conduct by his supporters and others had denied
him the nomination. See 2 JOHN SHERMAN, JOHN SHERMAN’S RECOLLECTIONS OF
FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE, SENATE AND CABINET 1029–30 (1895).
68 Richardson, 43 N.W. at 1102.
69 People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Tr. Co., 22 N.E. 798, 801 (Ill. 1889).
70 Id. at 802. A few years later, the Supreme Court of Iowa refused to enforce a
contract through which grocers in Storm Lake ceded the butter trade to a single
firm. Chaplin v. Brown, 48 N.W. 1074, 1075 (Iowa 1891). That firm sought
damages for a breach by one of those grocers. Id. The contract was deemed
unenforceable as “against public policy” because it “plainly tends to monopolize
butter trade at Storm Lake, and destroy competition in the business.” Id. at 1075.
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B. The Early Articulations of Limiting Principles for Section 2
The first judicial interpretation of Section 2 came very quickly in
a case that did not arise under the Sherman Act.71 American Biscuit
and Manufacturing Co. (now Nabisco, known for Oreos and Ritz
Crackers), acquired thirty-five cookie and cracker bakeries, including
one from the defendant, who refused to cede possession and wanted
the sale rescinded.72 American Biscuit sought appointment of a
receiver, but was rebuffed by the court on the basis that the Sherman
Act clouded the legitimacy of the sale and of American Biscuit’s entire
business.73 The court opined that “the word ‘monopolize’” meant “‘to
aggregate’ or ‘concentrate’ in the hands of few” and commented that
“the evil” to which Section 2 was directed was “the hindrance and
oppression in trade and commerce wrought by its absorption in the
hands of the few.”74
The most extensive early interpretation of Section 2 came in a
challenge to an indictment of individuals involved with the whiskey
trust.75 The 1892 decision granted the habeas corpus petition of Louis
H. Greene.76 He was charged with violations of Section 1 and Section
2, and the Section 2 allegation was an attempt to monopolize based on
the use of sales contracts with rebates conditioned on the purchaser not
buying from any other supplier, and on not selling at less than specified
list prices.77 The court ordered the prisoner discharged after finding the
indictment deficient.78
The court began its discussion of Section 2 by asserting that
Congress did not “declare that, when the accumulation or control of
property by legitimate means and lawful methods reached such
magnitude or proportions as enabled the owner or owners to control
the traffic therein . . . a criminal offense was committed by such owner
or owners.”79 Relying on the legal definition of “monopoly” and the
                                                
71 Am. Biscuit & Mfg. Co. v. Klotz, 44 F. 721 (C.C.E.D. La. 1891).
72 Id. at 723–24.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 724–25.
75 In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 108 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892).
76 Id. at 119. For related opinions involving other individual defendants in the same
case, see In re Corning, 51 F. 205, 212 (N.D. Ohio 1892) (holding with little
explanation that the indictment was “insufficient to make out the crime covered by”
Section 2) and In re Terrell, 51 F. 213, 215 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) (concurring with
the reasoning of Corning).
77 In re Greene, 52 F. at 109–10.
78 Id. at 119.
79 Id. at 115.
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second definition of “monopolize” read by Senator Edmunds in the
April 8 Senate debate, the court perceived “two leading elements” to
monopoly: “an exclusive right or privilege . . . and a restriction or
restraint . . . which will operate to prevent the exercise of a right or
liberty open to the public before the monopoly was secured.”80 The
court concluded that an “‘attempt to monopolize’ . . . must be an
attempt to secure or acquire an exclusive right . . . by means which
prevent or restrain others from engaging therein.”81 The court
evidently had in mind something like exclusive dealing, which denies
others access to certain customers. The court emphatically held that
the whiskey trust itself did not offend Section 2 by controlling three-
quarters of production.82 And the court held that the rebate scheme
described in the indictment did not offend Section 2 because every
purchaser was free to do as he pleased.83
The court was right to take guidance from the April 8 Senate debate
but wrong to think it supported the court’s crabbed view of Section 2.84
The legal definition of monopoly was not directly relevant, and the
first definition that Senator Edmunds read did not refer to an
“exclusive right.”85 Nor was an exclusive right part of Senator Hoar’s
explanation that “monopoly” entailed “the use of means which made
it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition,” such as
“buying up of all other persons engaged in the same business.”86
On a more productive track was an 1893 ruling on the sufficiency
of a Sherman Act indictment returned against executives of National
Cash Register Co. (NCR), charged with violating both Section 1 and
Section 2 by conspiring with the object of driving rivals out of
business.87 The court initially noted that it could not “take the views or
                                                
80 Id. at 116.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 116–18.
84 Cf. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983). In this respect, the
court relied on the debates in the manner seen as the vice of relying on legislative
history for indications of legislators’ intentions. Judge Wald attributed to her D.C.
Circuit colleague Harold Leventhal the observation that citing legislative history
can be like “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.” Id.
85 See supra text accompanying note 52.
86 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890) (statement by Sen. Hoar). See supra text
accompanying note 49.
87 United States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605, 606 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893). The government
argued that “to monopolize” meant “preventing” rivals from competing: “The evil
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purposes expressed in debate as supplying the construction of statutes”
but it could “gather from the debates in [C]ongress, as . . . from any
other source, the history of the evil which the legislation was intended
to remedy.”88 The court held that “it is not sufficient simply to allege
a purpose to drive certain competitors out of the field by violence,
annoyance, intimidation, or otherwise” if it is not alleged that result
would be “engrossing or monopolizing or grasping the market.”89 On
this basis, the court quashed all but the four counts of the indictment
containing “allegations of an intent to engross, monopolize, and grasp,
and of means clearly unlawful, and adapted to accomplish this
intent.”90
The first two Supreme Court decisions under the Sherman Act
came in 1895 and 1897. The first addressed only what commerce was
within the Act’s scope.91 The second construed Section 1 but not
Section 2.92 In doing so, the Court related the approach to statutory
construction articulated in the NCR case. It declared that “debates in
Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to
discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body”
because it is “impossible to determine with certainty what construction
was put upon an act by the members of a legislative body that passed
it” and that “the only proper way to construe a legislative act is from
the language used in the act, and upon occasion, by resort to the history
of the times when it was passed.”93
Much the same issue as in the whiskey trust case was presented in
a private damages case decided in 1903. The defendant tobacco
products manufacturer refused to sell products to the plaintiff on terms
                                                
is not the enlargement of one person’s trade, but the destruction of the trade of all
other persons in the same commodity.” Id. at 611.
88 Id. at 641.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
92 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 312, 343–55
(1897). In a dissent joined by three other justices, Justice Edward D. White argued
for an interpretation grounded in the common law, under which only unreasonable
restraints were prohibited.
93 Id. at 318–19; see United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875)
(“In construing an act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of
individual members in debate, nor to consider the motives which influenced them
to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this
is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may
with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed; and this is
frequently necessary, in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of
particular provisions in it.”).
2019] HOW CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE HAMPERED DEVELOPMENT 77
that would allow him to make a profit unless he refrained from selling
products of competing tobacco manufacturers.94 The plaintiff argued
that this constituted an attempt to monopolize in violation of Section
2.95 The court took the view that “every sale . . . is a successful attempt
to monopolize . . . . An attempt by each competitor to monopolize a
part of interstate commerce is the very root of all competition,” but that
to read Section 2 to stifle competition itself “is unreasonable and
inconsistent with the object and spirit of the law.”96 The court opined
that the purpose of Section 2 was “to prevent the restriction of
competition,” not “to prohibit or to punish the customary and universal
attempts of all manufacturers, merchants, and traders” to enlarge their
trade while leaving “their competitors free to make successful
endeavors of the same kind.”97 The court added that Section 2 did not
prohibit conduct if its “main purpose and chief effect are to increase
the trade and foster the business of those who” engage in it.98
The foregoing decisions identified the need for limiting principles
for Section 2 then tried to articulate them. All of the decisions began
with the insight that Section 2 should be read to prohibit only conduct
that could be objectively viewed as improper, and most focused on
whether the alleged conduct would improperly impair rivals’ abilities
to compete. The NCR decision additionally rejected charges that
recited improper conduct but failed to explain how it would unduly
concentrate the market.
The whiskey and tobacco decisions were the first attempts to
articulate the key principle that winning business, even the lion’s share
of business, by offering a better bargain than rivals is lawful
competition on the merits. The whiskey decision held that: “The
promise of a rebate, as an inducement for exclusive trading certainly
does not constitute an ‘attempt to monopolize,’ when the purchaser is
left at liberty to buy where he pleases, and when all other sellers of the
article are left unrestrained in offering the same, or greater,
inducements.”99 The tobacco decision held that the conduct at issue
did not violate Section 2 because it “evidenced nothing but the
legitimate efforts of traders to secure for themselves as large a part of
interstate trade as possible, while they left their competitors free to do
the same.”100 In the absence of evidence to the contrary from the
                                                
94 Whitwell v. Cont’l Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, 455–56 (8th Cir. 1903).
95 Id. at 456.
96 Id. at 462.
97 Id. at 462–63.
98 Id. at 463.
99 In re Greene, 52 F. at 117.
100 Whitwell, 125 F. at 462.
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plaintiffs, both courts presumed that the defendants’ rivals could
successfully compete on the merits by making similar offers.
C. The Northern Securities Decision
By a bare majority, the Supreme Court’s Northern Securities
decision held that the merger of two competing railroads violated
Section 1.101 Comments on the meaning of Section 2 were included in
the dissent written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and joined by
Chief Justice Melville Fuller, future Chief Justice Edward D. White,
Jr., and Justice Rufus W. Peckham.102 Holmes had published a short
article on interpreting legal texts.103 It argued that the task is not a
matter of determining what the author meant, but rather of determining
what the “words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of
English.”104 With statutes, the article asserted: “We do not inquire
what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”105 In
Northern Securities, Holmes observed: “According to popular speech,
every concern monopolizes whatever business it does . . . . Of course,
the statute does not forbid that. It does not mean that all business must
cease.”106
Holmes read Section 1 to be co-extensive with common law and,
argued that Section 2 was “more important as an aid to the construction
of § 1 than it is on its own account. It shows that “whatever is criminal
when done by way of combination is equally criminal if done by a
single man.”107 He supported this view by asserting that Section 1
was suggested by the trusts, the objection to which, as every
one knows, was not the union of former competitors, but the
sinister power exercised or supposed to be exercised by the
combination in keeping rivals out of the business and ruining
those who already were in. It was the ferocious extreme of
competition with others, not the cessation of competition
among the partners, that was the evil feared.108
                                                
101 N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
102 See Id. at 406 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
103 See Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417 (1899).
104 Id. at 417.
105 Id. at 419.
106 N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 406 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 404.
108 Id. at 405.
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Finally, he cited the provision of the Sherman Act giving injured
parties the right to sue for damages,109 and he asserted that this must
refer to persons “who are injured in their attempt to compete with a
trust.”110
The upshot was that Holmes interpreted the Sherman Act to
prohibit only the exclusionary conduct attributed to trusts, and not
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies producing cartels:
[I]n my opinion there is no attempt to monopolize, and what,
as I have said, in my judgment amounts to the same thing, that
there is no combination in restraint of trade, until something is
done with the intent to exclude strangers to the combination
from competing with it in some part of the business which it
carries on.111
III. THE STANDARD OIL AND AMERICAN TOBACCO CASES
Edward D. White, Jr. was elevated to Chief Justice on December
19, 1910. In January he presided over seven days of argument in
American Tobacco and Standard Oil, and he wrote the lengthy
opinions the Court issued in May. In between, the Court issued
eighteen other opinions that he authored. White could not have had
much time to think and write about Section 2. Although his findings
of Section 2 violations in the two cases arguably rested on sound
limiting principles, he did not articulate them. And by not articulating
any principles or acknowledging efforts by courts to do so, White
effectively hit the reset button.
A. Standard Oil112
The Standard Oil case focused on the 1899 consolidation of the
many companies in the Standard family into Standard Oil of New
                                                
109 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012)).
110 N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 405.
111 Id. at 409; see also id. at 408 (opining that Section 1 prohibited only agreements
“formed for the purpose of excluding others from the field”).
112 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 173 F. 177 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1909),
aff ’d, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). A useful account of the case is provided by James May,
The Story of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, in ANTITRUST STORIES 7 (Eleanor
M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).
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Jersey. That company’s charter was amended to give it vast new
powers, including the power to hold shares in other companies, and its
capital stock was increased by $100 million, then its stock was
exchanged for the shares of the companies.113 In November 1906, the
Attorney General petitioned for dissolution of the consolidation,
alleging that it violated Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The defendants contended that this final consolidation did not
really affect competition, but the trial court held that it allowed “the
power . . . to fix the prices” to be “more easily and quickly
exercised.”114 The court recited five categories of alleged
anticompetitive conduct, including preferential railroad rates and
predatory pricing, but declared that the “gist” of the alleged Section 2
violation was “the combination and conspiracy of the numerous
defendants, many of them formerly competitors, to restrain trade and
to monopolize that commerce.”115 In short, the consolidation itself was
alleged to violate Section 2.
The trial court opined that every sale “evidences a successful
attempt to monopolize” that small part of commerce but agreed with
the defense that Section 2 was not violated “unless unlawful means are
used.”116 The court held that Section 2 must be construed so “as to
abate the mischief it was passed to destroy,” and because the Sherman
Act “was enacted, not to stifle, but to foster, competition, . . . legitimate
competition, however successful, [is] not denounced by the law.”117
The court, thus, squarely held that “legitimate competition,” i.e.,
competition on the merits, did not violate Section 2. But the court also
held that “combination and conspiracy” were unlawful means of
obtaining monopoly, so Section 2 was violated even without any of the
“other unlawful means” alleged by the government.118
As provided by the law at the time,119 Standard Oil appealed
directly to the Supreme Court. The briefs occupied more than two
thousand pages, and the case was argued over three days in March
1910, then reargued over four days in January 1911. Between those
                                                
113 Standard Oil, 173 F. at 182; Brief for Appellants, Vol. I–Law at 13–14,
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (No. 10-398).
114 Standard Oil, 173 F. at 189.
115 Id. at 190.
116 Id. at 191.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 191–92.
119 Expediting Act, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823 (1903) (the right of direct Supreme
Court appeal in government antitrust cases was eliminated by the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 1709 (1974)).
2019] HOW CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE HAMPERED DEVELOPMENT 81
arguments, White was promoted to Chief Justice upon the death of
Melville Fuller, and three new Justices took their seats on the Court.
Chief Justice White’s Standard Oil opinion remains a foundation stone
of Section 1 law. In a 5-4 decision, Trans-Missouri Freight
Association had held that Section 1 did not apply a rule of reason, with
Justice White authoring a lengthy dissent.120 In Standard Oil, however,
Chief Justice White wrote for a nearly unanimous Court holding that
Section 1 does apply a rule of reason.121 The rule of reason is
considered White’s “single greatest legal contribution.”122
White recited the rule that “debates may not be used as a means for
interpreting a statute” and observed that the rule “is not violated by
resorting to debates as a means of ascertaining the environment at the
time of the enactment of a particular law, that is, the history of the
period when it was adopted.”123 He relied on the Senate debate for the
proposition that both Section 1 and Section 2 were written in terms that
“took their origin in the common law, and were also familiar in the law
of this country prior to and at the time of the adoption of the” Sherman
Act.124 White was “guided by the principle that where words are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at
common law or in the law of this country, they are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.”125
On that basis, he read Section 1 to employ a rule of reason as did the
common law.126
                                                
120 See generally United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897). White’s dissent cogently reviewed the common law and made the case for
interpreting Section 1 to adopt its content. See id. at 343–56. The lucidity of the
opinion places it is stark contrast to his turgid opinion in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
121 Standard Oil., 221 U.S. at 61–62. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment, but
argued that the text of the statute and the Court’s precedent both precluded
adoption of the rule of reason. Id. at 86–105.
122 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
1087 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
123 Standard Oil, 221 U.S at 50.
124 Id. at 50–51.
125 Id. at 59.
126 Id. at 60, 66. Restraints of trade were never indictable at common law; rather,
the law merely declared unenforceable private contracts deemed contrary to public
policy. English courts enforced many sorts of contracts that would were made
unlawful by Section 1. See W. ARNOLD JOLLY, CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF
TRADE 41–55 (1900). In 1889 Chief Justice Fuller described U.S. common law on
“contracts in restraint of trade” this way: “Public welfare is first considered, and if
it be not involved, and the restraint upon one party is not greater than protection to
the other party requires, the contract may be sustained. The question is, whether,
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Chief Justice White followed a parallel path with Section 2. He
asserted that “attempt to monopolize and monopolization,” “at least in
their rudimentary meaning, took their origin in the common law, and
were also familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the time of
the adoption of the [Sherman Act].”127 He began with the common law
meaning of “monopoly,” which was a crown grant of exclusivity.128
He then related “monopoly” to the offense of “engrossing,”129 which
once had been prohibited by English law governing middlemen:130
Forestalling, ingrossing, and regrating was the offence of
buying up large quantities of any article of commerce for the
purpose of raising the price. The forestaller intercepted goods
on their way to market and bought them up, so as to be able to
command what price he chose when he got to the market. The
ingrosser or regrator—for the two words had much the same
meaning—was a person who, having bought goods wholesale,
sold them again wholesale. This was regarded as a crime.131
White argued that “the principal wrong” of both monopoly and
engrossing was “enhancement of the price,” and
                                                
under the particular circumstances of the case and the nature of the particular
contract involved in it, the contract is, or is not, unreasonable.” Gibbs v. Consol.
Gas Co. of Baltimore, 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889). The Supreme Court relied on
Gibbs in holding resale price maintenance contrary to public policy. See Dr. Miles
Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406 (1911). Judge William
Howard Taft restated the private welfare prong as the ancillary restraint doctrine.
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff ’d as
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
127 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51.
128 Id. at 51–52.
129 Id. at 52–53.
130 These laws were repealed in 1844. 7 & 6 Vict., c. 24 (Eng. 1844). The repealing
statute was read into the record of the S. 1 Senate debate at the request of Senator
William M. Stewart, who had issues with Sherman’s version of S. 1. 21 CONG.
REC. 2,564–65 (1890). No reported state court decision after 1844 recognized a
common-law offense of forestalling, engrossing, and regrating. An 1876 Missouri
appeals court decision held that public policy no longer considered forestalling,
engrossing, and regrating contrary to public policy. Koehler v. Feuerbacher, 2 Mo.
App. 11, 14 (1876).
131 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 199
(London, Macmillan & Co. 1883). See Adler, supra note 53, at 251–57; Dana,
supra note 54, at 343–47; Wendell Herbruck, Forestalling, Regrating, and
Engrossing, 27 MICH. L. REV. 365 (1929).
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it came to pass that monopoly and engrossing were regarded as
virtually one and the same thing. In other words, the prohibited
act of engrossing, because of its inevitable accomplishment of
one of the evils deemed to be engendered by monopoly, came
to be referred to as being a monopoly or constituting an attempt
to monopolize.132
Similar to Holmes’ dissent in Northern Securities, which White
joined,133 he declared Section 2 to be a mere “supplement” to Section
1,134 and asserted that any “ambiguity” about what Congress meant by
“monopolize” “is readily dispelled in the light of the previous history
of the law of restraint of trade.”135 To White, viewing Section 2 as “the
complement of” Section 1 made obvious that the criteria to be resorted
to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations
of [Section 2] have been committed, is the rule of reason guided by the
established law and by the plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the
act and thus the public policy which its restrictions were obviously
enacted to subserve.136 He additionally observed that Section 2
contains no “direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete.”137
White saw “no cause to doubt the correctness of” the trial court’s
holding that the 1899 consolidation brought “about a perennial
violation” of Section 2.138 The “unification of power and control over
petroleum and its products” resulting from the consolidation gave rise
to a presumption of intent and purpose to maintain the dominancy over
the oil industry, not as a result of normal methods of industrial
development, but by new means of combination which were resorted
to in order that greater power might be added than would otherwise
have arisen had normal methods been followed.139
And this presumption was “made conclusive by considering”
Standard Oil’s conduct and its history.140 White used the “numerous
charges of wrongdoing” made by the government relevant “solely as
                                                
132 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 53. See William L. Letwin, English Common Law
Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 368 (1954) (citing an English
decision from 1685).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 101–111.
134 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
135 Id. at 61.
136 Id. at 61–62.
137 Id. at 62.
138 Id. at 74.
139 Id. at 75.
140 Id.
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an aid for discovering intent and purpose,”141 and found the requisite
anticompetitive intent in proof that Standard Oil had not pursued the
“development of business power by usual methods,” but rather acted
“to drive others from the field and to exclude them from their right to
trade.”142
In articulating Section 2’s meaning, White’s only reference to
limiting principles was a vague reference to “the rule of reason,” but
he said a bit more in upholding the lower court’s holding that Standard
Oil violated Section 2.143 Much as the lower court, he characterized
what Section 2 made unlawful as conduct designed “to drive others
from the field and to exclude them from their right to trade” by
employing something other than “normal methods” or “usual
methods” of competition.144 Thus, he condemned only conduct that
impaired the abilities of rivals to compete through means that were not
legitimate competition on the merits,145 and this must be what he meant
by the rule of reason under Section 2.146
B. American Tobacco
Two weeks after the Supreme Court decided Standard Oil, it
decided American Tobacco.147 American Tobacco Co. was formed in
1890 through the consolidation of companies accounting for about
95% of U.S. cigarette production, and it grew through what the
government termed “ferocious” and “unfair trading methods” that
drove rivals out of business or allowed American Tobacco to absorb
them.148 In a July 1907 petition, the Attorney General sought to break
                                                
141 Id. at 76.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 62, 74–77. We are left to speculate about why Chief Justice White did not
explicitly articulate any limiting principles he applied because he left no papers for
scholars to examine. See ALEXANDRA K. WIGDOR, THE PERSONAL PAPERS OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE, 221 (1986). White likely was
concerned about taking the focus off of the rule of reason, and he might have been
unable to forge consensus among the justices on the meaning of Section 2.
144 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 75–76.
145 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 606, at 6–
11 (rev. ed. 1996).
146 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62.
147 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
148 Brief for the United States at 130, 243, United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911) (No. 10-118).
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up the company. Four circuit court judges sat in the district court149
and issued four separate opinions.150 Three found a Section 1 violation.
Just two of the four mentioned Section 2, and neither found a Section
2 violation.
Judge Walter Chadwick Noyes ruled for the government and began
his Section 2 analysis by asking whether American Tobacco possessed
what we now call monopoly power, and he found that it did.151 He
noted that American Tobacco accounted for at least 70% of U.S.
production of six types of tobacco products and several tobacco-related
products, such as the foil used in cigarette packages.152 He noted that
American Tobacco controlled “most of the well-established and
popular brands” and that significant difficulties attended establishment
of a new brand.153 He found that American Tobacco could dictate
prices both to tobacco farmers and to users of tobacco products.154 But
he nevertheless declined to hold American Tobacco in violation of
Section 2 because he doubted that Section 2 condemned the mere
possession of monopoly power and little in the record demonstrated
“elements of oppression and coercion” by American Tobacco in
achieving its dominance.155
Judge Henry G. Ward ruled against the government and began his
analysis of Section 2 by stating that it “cannot be literally construed”
because the Sherman Act would then “prohibit commerce
altogether.”156 He opined that Section 2 “must be understood to
prohibit monopolies or attempts to monopolize brought about . . . by
preventing competition and preventing others from participating in
it.”157 He found no proof of a Section 2 violation because American
Tobacco and its codefendants merely “strove, as every business man
                                                
149 As in Standard Oil, the Attorney General invoked the Expediting Act, ch. 544,
§ 2, 32 Stat. 823 (1903) (the right of direct Supreme Court appeal in government
antitrust cases was eliminated by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of
1974, Pub. L. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 1709 (1974)), under which at least three circuit
court judges heard the case in the trial court if the circuit had that many.
150 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 164 F. 700 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
151 Id. at 719–20. Noyes had previously published scholarly works relating to the
Sherman Act and later proposed trust legislation. WALTER CHADWICK NOYES, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS 546–88 (1902), Walter C.
Noyes, Possible Federal Trust Legislation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 93 (1907).
152 American Tobacco, 164 F. at 719.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 720–21.
155 Id. at 721–22.
156 Id. at 727 (Ward, J., dissenting).
157 Id.
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strives, to increase their business, and that their great success is a
natural growth resulting from industry, intelligence, and economy,
doubtless largely helped by the volume of business done and the great
capital at command.”158
Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court, and the briefs were
nearly as long as those in Standard Oil. The case was argued over four
days in January 1910, and reargued over four days in January 1911. As
with Standard Oil, Chief Justice White wrote the opinion for the nearly
unanimous Court.159 He found that the defendant’s course of conduct
violated both Section 1 and Section 2 without parsing what conduct
violated which prohibition.160
White set out six findings establishing that American Tobacco’s
“dominion and control over the tobacco trade” was associated with
“wrongful purpose and illegal combination” and therefore violated the
Sherman Act.161 Two seem relevant to Section 2: American Tobacco
acted to “monopolize the trade in tobacco by means of trade conflicts
designed to injure others, either by driving competitors out of the
business or compelling them to become parties to a combination.”162
And American Tobacco made the “persistent expenditure of millions
upon millions of dollars in buying out plants, not for the purpose of
utilizing them, but in order to close them up and render them useless
for the purposes of trade.”163 These findings suggest that American
Tobacco was condemned under Section 2 for impairing the abilities of
rivals to compete through methods that were not legitimate
competition on the merits. Chief Justice White’s American Tobacco
opinion, however, avoided any affirmative statement on the meaning
of Section 2.
C. The Aftermath of American Tobacco and Standard Oil
A 1912 ruling on the sufficiency of an indictment charging
exclusionary conduct in violation of Section 2 took guidance on its
meaning mainly from Standard Oil.164 In setting aside the convictions
                                                
158 Id. at 728.
159 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 142 (1911). Again, Justice
Harlan concurred in the judgment but took issue with the rule of reason. Id. at 189–
93.
160 Id. at 183–84.
161 Id. at 182–83.
162 Id. at 182.
163 Id. at 183.
164 United States v. Patterson, 201 F. 697, 711–14 (S.D. Ohio 1912).
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resulting from the ensuing trial, the Sixth Circuit’s Patterson decision
was written as if the Section 2 slate was clean.165 The circuit court
pronounced that: “The word ‘monopolize’ is used in [Section 2] in a
legal and accurate sense. Its root idea is to exclude. To monopolize
trade or commerce, or a part thereof, is to exclude persons therefrom.
It is not, however, to exclude all persons.”166 The court declared that
Section 2 “does not cover every monopolizing by the acts of
individuals. A monopolizing by efficiency in producing and marketing
a better and cheaper article than any one else is not within it.”167 The
court explained:
But, though but one competitor can make a sale, all competitors
can enjoy the free opportunity of approaching each and every
prospective purchaser on equal terms, with the chance of
making a sale if he can persuade him to buy. For one
competitor to exclude all or substantially all other competitors
from such opportunity—i.e., drive them from the field of freely
offering their goods, so as to have that field to himself—is to
monopolize according to the legal and accurate sense of the
word.168
These well-formed limiting principles might have borrowed from
earlier lower court decisions, but none were cited because Standard
Oil had undermined their authority.
During the quarter century following the Sixth Circuit’s Patterson
decision, the only important Section 2 case was United States Steel.169
United States Steel was a huge holding company created in 1901. The
lower court found that “therewas no evidence that it attempted to crush
its competitors or drive them out of themarket” through localized price
cutting or vertical restraints.170 The Supreme Court affirmed judgment
                                                
165 Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th Cir. 1915). Like the 1893 case of the
same name, see supra text accompanying notes 87–90, this case involved
allegations against National Cash Register Co. In this case, twenty-seven
individuals were sentenced to terms of imprisonment averaging just under a year,
but the convictions were overturned on appeal, and none were retried.
166 Id. at 619.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 620–21.
169 United States v. U.S. Steel Co., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
170 Id. at 440–41.
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in the company’s favor largely on the basis that the Sherman Act “does
not make mere size an offense” but rather “requires overt acts.”171
The 1941 district court decision in Alcoa relied on United States
Steel for the proposition that an element of a Section 2 violation was
the use of monopoly power “to keep out or with the purpose of keeping
out competitors,—which keeping out is identical in significance and
meaning with ‘excluding.’”172 The court additionally cited Patterson
for the proposition that “in order to establish monopolization it must
be shown that the accused excluded or attempted or by his conduct
intended to exclude his competitor or competitors.”173
Learned Hand’s appellate decision in Alcoa took a more expansive
view of Section 2’s prohibitions.174 His feeble limiting principle was
that Section 2 was not violated when monopoly was “thrust upon” the
defendant “by automatically operative economic forces.”175 He held
that merely building capacity to keep up with demand did violate
Section 2.176 The following year, the Supreme Court endorsed
passages from Hand’s Alcoa opinion and applied his feeble limiting
principle in observing that monopoly had not been “thrust upon” the
defendant.177
The 1951 Lorain Journal decision held that a newspaper’s efforts
to “destroy threatened competition” violated Section 2, without
articulating any standard.178 The 1956 Cellophane decision read
Standard Oil to hold that Section 2 “declared illegal” “acts bringing
                                                
171 Id. at 451. Later Supreme Court decisions cast some doubt on this holding. See
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106–07, 110 n.10 (1948).
172 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 44 F. Supp. 97, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
173 Id. at 157–58. The court viewed Patterson as authoritative because the Supreme
Court recently had cited it. Id. at 158 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225–26 (1940)). The Supreme Court, however, had not cited
Patterson on Section 2 law.
174 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–31 (2d Cir. 1945).
On direct appeal from the district court, the Supreme Court first postponed
consideration of the case because four Justices disqualified themselves, leaving the
Court without the quorum of six necessary to act. United States v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 320 U.S. 708 (1943). Congress then created a procedure for dealing with
such cases. Act to amend the Expediting Act, ch. 239, 58 Stat. 272 (1944) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2012)). Three days later, the Supreme Court certified
the case to the Second Circuit. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 322
U.S. 716 (1944).
175 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429–30. See United States v. United Shoe Mach., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 341–42 (D. Mass. 1953) (analyzing Section 2 law after Alcoa).
176 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430–31.
177 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 786, 811–14 (1946).
178 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 154 (1951).
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the evils of” monopoly.179 The Court observed that it had previously
“left as an undecided possibility” the scenario in which monopoly was
the lawful consequence of competition on the merits, and again left the
issue undecided.180 After Cellophane, Section 2 law was less clear than
in had been before Standard Oil.
The Supreme Court began to clarify Section 2 law in 1966,
borrowing from the government’s brief in Grinnell the dictum that the
offense of monopolization under Section 2 had “two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.”181
In 1985 the Supreme Court articulated the current understanding
of Section 2. The Court held that Section 2 prohibits only conduct
“fairly characterized as ‘exclusionary’ or ‘anticompetitive’ . . . or
‘predatory.’”182 And the Court quoted the leading treatise explaining
that “‘exclusionary’ comprehends at the most behavior that not only
(1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does
not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily
restrictive way.”183
IV. HOW SECTION 2 LAW COULD HAVE DEVELOPED DIFFERENTLY
A. Courts Could Have Relied on History
Chief Justice White wrote in Standard Oil that the Court could
glean the meaning of the Sherman Act from “the history of the period
when” it was enacted,184 but he elected not to examine that history.
                                                
179 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956)
(citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56, 60–62 (1911)).
180 Id. at 390–91 (citing 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890) and Alcoa).
181 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). The quoted
passage was the first sentence in the argument section of government’s brief,
although with citations and a few words omitted. See Brief for the United States at
41, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (Nos. 73-77). The
Grinnell dictum was endorsed in the Court’s most recent Section 2 decision.
Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Off. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
182 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).
183 Id. at 605 n.32 (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶ 626b, at 78 (1978)).
184 See supra text accompanying note 123.
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Nor had earlier Section 2 decisions endorsing reliance on history185
investigated the relevant history in any depth. Holmes’ dissent in
Northern Securities correctly identified exclusionary conduct as the
evil that inspired Section 2, although he was incorrect to think that the
same evil animated Section 1.186 Trusts were condemned as buying
and selling cartels, harming both their suppliers and their customers.187
This evil was directly addressed by Section 1’s prohibition of “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint” of trade.188
The conduct for which Standard Oil had been condemned provided
the best guide to what was unlawful exclusionary conduct rather than
lawful competition on the merits. By juxtaposing the comments of
Senators Edwards and Hoar with the conduct attributed to Standard
Oil, courts could have drawn the rough contours of Section 2’s
prohibitions. Extracting rebates or discriminatory rates from railroads
was exclusionary, but enjoying cost-justified rate differences was not.
Predatory pricing was exclusionary, but not merely charging different
prices depending on the degree of competition was not. And
sabotaging a rival’s factory was exclusionary without qualification.
Chief Justice White had a unique opportunity to examine “the history
of the period when” Section 2 was enacted because exclusionary
conduct attributed to Standard Oil was chronicled in the government’s
Supreme Court brief.189 In addition, the fledgling Bureau of
                                                
185 See supra text accompanying notes 88, 93.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 107–10.
187 As Senator Sherman put it, trusts “operate as a double-edged sword. They
increase beyond reason the cost of necessaries of life and business, and they
decrease the cost of raw material, the farm products of the country. They regulate
prices at will, depress the price of what they buy and increase the price of what the
sell.” 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890) (quoting Senator James Z. George).
188 Holmes incorrectly read the damages provision of the Sherman Act to provide a
remedy only to victims of exclusionary conduct. Victims of cartels made unlawful
by Section 1 were given the right to sue for damages, and the first reported
decisions in such suits predated the Northern Securities decision. City of Atlanta v.
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Co., 101 F. 900 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1900), rev’d, 127 F.
23 (6th Cir. 1903).
189 The extensive briefing in the cases detailed many things, including the railroad
rebates before 1882. See Brief for the United States, Vol. 2: Detailed Statement of
Facts at 159–96, Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (No.
10-398); see also Brief for Appellants, Vol. II–Facts at 42–59 (Standard Oil’s view
of the history), Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (No.
10-398).
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Corporations had documented the history in lengthy reports available
to the Court.190
B. Courts Could Have Relied on Scholarship
The earliest Section 2 decisions could not have drawn on legal and
economic literature. Economists, in particular, were disengaged from
the public discussion that led up to the Sherman Act.191 And during the
Act’s first decade, economists’ contribution to the literature on
antitrust was mainly to condemn the Sherman Act. Richard T. Ely
argued that the Act “has produced harm and can produce nothing but
harm.”192 He found that its effect had been to “increase centralization
and to strengthen monopoly”; by outlawing trusts and less formal
attempts to cartelize, the Sherman Act had led to a great wave of
                                                
190 See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
CORPORATIONS ON THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, PART I: POSITION OF THE
STANDARD OIL COMPANY IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 24 (1907) (“The fact can
not be too strongly emphasized that the corner stone of the Standard Oil
Company’s power to-day was contributed by the railroads in the form of the
enormous rate concessions given that company at the beginning of its career.”);
U.S. BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
CORPORATIONS ON THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, PART II: PRICES AND PROFITS 39
(1907) (“The evidence is, in fact, absolutely conclusive that the Standard Oil
Company charges altogether excessive prices where it meets no competition, . . .
and that, on the other hand, where competition is active, it frequently cuts price to a
point which leaves even the Standard little or no profit, and which more often
leaves no profit to the competitor, whose costs are ordinarily somewhat higher.”).
191 “A careful student of the history of economics would have searched long and
hard, on July 2 of 1890, the day the Sherman Act was signed by President Harrison,
for any economist who had ever recommended the policy of actively combatting
collusion or monopolization in the economy at large.” George J. Stigler, The
Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.)
1, 3 (1982). The leading British economist in the field, Cambridge professor Alfred
Marshall, commented in 1890 that Section 2 was “perhaps intended to be the
expression of a sentiment that may help to guide public opinion, rather than an
enactment which will bear much direct fruit.” Alfred Marshall, Some Aspects of
Competition, 53 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 612, 628 (1890). A review of pre-Sherman
Act economists’ writings on trusts is provided by Sanford D. Gordon, Attitudes of
Economists Toward Industrial Combinations in the Decade Preceding Passage of
the Sherman Act, 2 ECON. INQUIRY 24 (1963).
192 Richard T. Ely, The Nature and Significance of Monopolies and Trusts, 10 INT’L
J. ETHICS 273, 283 (1900). The Sherman Act also got no respect from economists
early in the 20th Century. Harvard professor Frank W. Taussig called it “slap-dash
legislation.” F.W. Taussig, What Next?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS AND COMBINATIONS 374, 379 (National Civic Federation
1908).
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mergers.193 The situation changed substantially by the time American
Tobacco and Standard Oil were decided by the Supreme Court, but
neither government briefs nor Supreme Court opinions in antitrust
cases had begun to cite scholarship, and there is scant evidence that it
was consulted.194 Nevertheless, Justice Holmes observed in his
Northern Securities dissent that “at times judges need for their work
the training of economists,”195 and Holmes corresponded regularly
with Richard T. Ely.196
During the first quarter century of antitrust in the United States,
John Bates Clark “wrote more extensively on the trust problem than
did any other contemporary economist.”197 His early writings on trusts
argued that a direct attack on them was unnecessary because potential
competition would keep them in check.198 He then became the “leader
of the school which thought that banning unfair competition was all
that was needed to make potential competition effective.”199
                                                
193 RICHARD T. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS 240–46 (1900). By 1900 all trusts
on the Standard Oil model were long gone. “In their place manufacturers in a great
variety of industries [were] taking or ha[d] taken the final step of actual
consolidation.” CHARLES WHITING BAKER, MONOPOLIES AND THE PEOPLE 269 (3d
ed. 1899). On average, 301 firms per year disappeared through merger during
1895–1904, with a peak of 1208 in 1899. RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1895–1956, at 37 (1959).
194 Correspondence between Ely and Holmes indicates that Justice Joseph
McKenna likely consulted Ely’s book Monopolies and Trusts, supra note 193, in
writing the Court’s opinion in National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115
(1905), and that Holmes later read the book. See Benjamin G. Rader & Barbara K.
Rader, The Ely–Holmes Friendship, 1901–1914, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 128, 138–
40 (1966).
195 N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904).
196 See Rader & Rader, supra note 194.
197 Benjamin J. Klebaner, Trusts and Competition: A Note on John Bates Clark and
John Maurice Clark, 29 SOC. RES. 475, 475 (1962).
198 John Bates Clark, The “Trust”: A New Agent for Doing an Old Work: Or
Freedom Doing the Work of Monopoly, 52 N. ENGLANDER & YALE REV. 223, 225–
26 (1890) (“potential or latent competition” serves as a “check on the extortions” of
trusts); John Bates Clark, Capital and its Earnings, PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON.
ASS’N, May 1888, at 9, 63 (“a very effective competition survives the formation of
these seeming monopolies”).
199 Benjamin J. Klebaner, Potential Competition and the American Antitrust
Legislation of 1914, 38 BUS. HIST. REV. 163, 172 (1964). One member of this
school was Attorney General Philander C. Knox, who espoused Clark’s position in
reply to an inquiry from Senator Hoar on antitrust issues. REPLY OF THE
ATTORNEY-GENERAL DATED JANUARY 3, 1903, TO A COMMUNICATION DATED
DECEMBER 20, 1902, FROM THE HON. GEORGE F. HOAR, CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 57-73
(1903). Knox argued that “a monopoly in any industry would be impossible in this
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Beginning in 1899, Clark contended that trusts posed a danger because
their exclusionary practices stifled the competition that otherwise
could keep them in check. He identified three practices of serious
concern: discriminatory freight rates of railroads; predatory pricing
localized to particular products or places but financed by sales of other
products or in other places; and vertical restraints hampering rivals’
distribution.200 The first two practices were attributed to Standard Oil
before 1890, and the third was used later and in other sorts of
industries.201
Clark’s early writings found no merit in antitrust legislation, but,
in a 1904 lecture, he declared:
It is possible to suggest laws, which, if made and enforced,
would take the monopolistic character out of the trust while
leaving unimpaired its great power of production. That policy
would leave it in a condition to make things cheaply, export
them freely and give us a certain dominance in the markets of
the world; but it would take away the power to drive
competition out of the field.202
Clark influentially advocated new legislation between 1910 and
1914,203 when the Clayton Act204 and Federal Trade Commission
                                                
country . . . if competition were assured of a fair and open field and protected
against unfair, artificial, and discriminating practices.” Id. at 16.
200 See, e.g., JOHN BATES CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS: AN ARGUMENT IN
FAVOR OF CURBING THE POWER OF MONOPOLY BY A NATURAL METHOD 12–14,
33–34 (1901); John Bates Clark, The Real Dangers of the Trusts with Some
Suggestions as to Remedies, 68 CENTURY MAG. 954, 957 (1904); John Bates Clark,
Trusts, 15 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 190–92 (1900); Clark, supra note 19, at 404, 408–09.
Clark’s most complete statement on the issue was JOHN BATES CLARK & JOHN
MAURICE CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS 71–127 (1912).
201 Clark specifically referred to “factors’ agreements,” which made a distributor or
retailer the agent or “factor” of the manufacturer and contained provisions
controlling prices, rewarding loyalty, and punishing disloyalty. The text of some
actual factors’ agreements, including some used by the American Tobacco Co. and
Dr. Miles Medical Co., are provided by WILLIAM S. STEVENS, INDUSTRIAL
COMBINATIONS AND TRUSTS 118–59 (1913). Only one of the agreements
reproduced by Stevens pre-dated the Sherman Act.
202 JOHN BATES CLARK, THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF A GRAVE
DANGER AND OF THE NATURAL MODE OF AVERTING IT 29 (1904).
203 See Luca Fiorito, When Economics Faces the Economy: John Bates Clark and
the 1914 Antitrust Legislation, 25 REV. POL. ECON. 139 (2013).
204 Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)).
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Act205 became law.
Early in the 20th Century, the writings of John Bates Clark could
have supplemented the historical material available to the courts and
clarified the nature of the unilateral conduct threatening the
competitive process. For the most part, this was conduct had been
attributed to Standard Oil. But distribution contracts, akin to those at
issue in the whiskey trust and tobacco cases, came to prominence after
1890, and also were seen to threaten the competitive process.
Legal commentary on Section 2 began to appear while American
Tobacco and Standard Oil were pending at the Supreme Court. A law
review article argued that the “term ‘to monopolize’” applied only
when “control of commerce was concentrated to such an extent as to
put an end to reasonably competitive conditions,” which required
control of at least “one-half of the commerce in an article.”206 A book
argued that violating Section 2 entailed controlling “part of . . .
commerce . . . by the aid of impediments placed . . . in the paths of . .
. competitors.”207 When ex-Senator Edmunds was finally credited with
Section 2’s authorship, just after the American Tobacco decision, he
explained that Section 2 had been “designed and framed to check and
so far as possible, prevent” efforts “to crush out fair and useful
competition, and so dominate and monopolize the industries and trade
of the Republic.”208 And a 1913 treatise asserted that: “As used by the
[Sherman Act,] the verb ‘to monopolize’ means to destroy reasonably
competitive conditions in a branch of trade.”209
C. The Supreme Court Could Have Borrowed from Lower Court
Decisions
Before the American Tobacco and Standard Oil cases arrived at
the Supreme Court, the makings of sound limiting principles for
Section 2 could be found in lower court opinions. Had the Court freely
borrowed from these readily available sources, it could have pieced
together in 1911 roughly what it articulated much later.
                                                
205 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at
15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012)).
206 Victor Morawetz, The Supreme Court and the Anti-Trust Act, 10 COLUM. L.
REV. 687, 697–98 (1910).
207 WALKER, supra note 1, at 58.
208 George F. Edmunds, The Interstate Trust and Commerce Act of 1890, 194 N.
AM. REV. 801, 815–16 (1911).
209 W.W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 368–69
(1913).
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The 1966 Grinnell dictum is that “to monopolize” in violation of
Section 2 requires the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power
by means other than “a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”210 The monopoly power element had been hinted at in the
1893 National Cash Register case,211 and the conduct element’s critical
limiting principle was well stated in the 1903 tobacco decision.212 The
1985 Aspen Skiing standard is that Section 2 prohibits only conduct
“fairly characterized” as “exclusionary” in that it is not competition on
the merits and tends to exclude rivals.213 The idea that only objectively
exclusionary conduct violates Section 2 was hinted at by the 1892
whisky decision,214 and it was the central rationale of the 1903 tobacco
decision.215
The Supreme Court perhaps should not have been expected to cast
a wide net in reviewing lower court decisions interpreting Section 2,
but Chief Justice White’s opinions did not even recount what the
judgments under review in American Tobacco and Standard Oil had
opined on the meaning of Section 2. The lower court decision in
Standard Oil had squarely held that “legitimate competition,” i.e.,
competition on the merits, did not violate Section 2.216 One of the
opinions in American Tobacco had admirably articulated the requisites
of monopoly power,217 and another usefully asserted the principle that
Section 2 is violated only by “preventing competition and preventing
others from participating in it.”218
After Chief Justice White effectively dismissed the first two
decades Section 2 jurisprudence, the lower courts reconstructed it. The
1915 Patterson decision defined the verb “to monopolize” and
explained that Section 2 does not condemn success achieved through
superior “efficiency in producing and marketing a better and cheaper
article than anyone else” because Section 2 does not protect
competitors, but rather the right to compete.219 This idea was well
stated, although not put into practice, in Learned Hand’s Alcoa
                                                
210 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 87–90.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 94–97.
213 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602, 605
n.32 (1985).
214 See supra text accompanying notes 75–83.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 94–97.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 116–18.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 151–54.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 156–58.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 165–68.
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opinion.220 The Supreme Court never endorsed this limiting principle,
and the Court’s 1956 Cellophane decision explicitly declined to do
so.221
Substantial insight into the meaning of Section 2 was free for the
taking in lower court decisions, but the Supreme Court consistently
declined to borrow from lower courts. The result was to leave Section
2 law undeveloped. The Court’s failure to borrow from lower courts is
particularly conspicuous in retrospect because the standards the Court
eventually did articulate in 1966 and 1985 were borrowed, just not
from lower courts.
V. CONCLUSION
In contrast to Section 1, Section 2 of the Sherman Act was not
grounded in common law and therefore presented a puzzle.222 The
Supreme Court took nearly a century to articulate what Section 2 does
and does not prohibit and still has not crystalized the limiting
principles courts have groped for since 1891. The next time the
Supreme Court considers Section 2, it could then undertake an
intensive, historic examination akin to that of Justice Scalia’s opinions
in Crawford223 and Heller.224 Justice Gorsuch, who has proclaimed his
textualist philosophy,225 might be inspired by the opportunity, which
modern technology has vastly simplified. Historical research that once
                                                
220 “A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors,
merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong
argument can be made that, although, the result may expose the public to the evils
of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces
which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor,
having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.” United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
221 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
222 Antitrust scholarship on the early cases elides these differences and slights
Section 2. See, e.g., Martin J. Sklar, Sherman Antitrust Act Jurisprudence and
Federal Policy-Making in the Formative Period, 1890–1914, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 791, 817 (1990) (accepting the courts’ treatment of the monopolization and
attempt to monopolize offenses as “a subtype” of restraints of trade).
223 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
224 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
225 See Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the
Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 909 (2016) (“assiduous
focus on text, structure, and history is essential to the proper exercise of the judicial
function”).
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took months now takes only hours or just minutes.226
A thorough review of the relevant history would make clear that
Section 2 focuses on the character of the defendant’s conduct and that
Section 2 never prohibits competition on the merits. A firm’s
marketplace conduct is objectively competition on the merits when it
advances the firm’s interests in no way other than by reducing its cost
or better serving its customers. Examples of conduct that invariably
and unquestionably constitutes competition on the merits are
investment in cost-reducing plant and equipment and the introduction
of a genuinely new product. The Supreme Court can clarify Section 2
law by classing additional conduct as competition on the merits and by
empowering the lower courts to do so.
In sharpest contrast to competition on the merits, a firm’s conduct
is inherently exclusionary when it advances the firm’s interests in no
way other than by impairing its rivals’ abilities to compete or by
depriving its rivals of opportunities to compete. Examples of
inherently exclusionary conduct are a firm’s efforts to get a supplier or
distributor with which it does not do business to cease its dealings with
a rival. Such conduct is inherently exclusionary both when the efforts
involve the use of carrots and when the efforts involve the use of sticks.
When inherently exclusionary conduct can materially contribute to
maintaining a dominant market position or has a dangerous probability
of creating a dominant market position, it violates Section 2. The
Supreme Court can clarify Section 2 law by classing additional
conduct as inherently exclusionary and by empowering the lower
courts to do so.
Neither the text of the Sherman Act nor the history that led to it
lends support for result-oriented standards. The legality of conduct
under the Sherman Act should turn on the challenged conduct’s impact
on competition and not its impact on consumer welfare or any other
bottom-line measure of market performance. An evaluation of the
character of the conduct at issue often is much easier than an
evaluation of its bottom-line effects, and that is what the Sherman Act
called for.
                                                
226 In researching this article, the author took advantage of: AbeBooks (on-line
access to inventories of used book dealers); Cornell University’s Making of
America Collection (19th Century serials); corpus.byu.edu (bodies of writings for
determining how words and phrases were used); Gale Databases from CENAGE
Learning (Supreme Court records and briefs, 1832–1978); HathiTrust Digital
Library (over 15 million volumes); HeinOnLine (almost 12,500 legal classics,
Congressional Record, over 2,400 law reviews); JSTOR (nearly 2,500 academic
journals); ProQuest Congressional (federal legislative material); UNZ.org (many
once popular serials).

